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Žrtve i restorativna pravda
Building and toning:  
an analysis of the institutionalisation  
of mediation in penal matters in Hungary
Bo r B á l A  Fel l e g I*
S
ince 1 January 2007, victims of crimes and offenders have been offered the chance to 
have recourse to mediation in Hungary. This paper will first give a short overview of the 
current situation of mediation in penal matters in Hungary, then it will discuss some general 
phenomena and dilemmas concerning the general introduction of mediation. After that, I 
will present a SWOT analysis1 of the current Hungarian mediation system in penal matters. 
The main goal of this article is to set up certain criteria for the further development of the 
restorative approach. The lessons we have learnt, the strengths and opportunities of the 
system and the identification of weaknesses might prove useful for other countries when 
they choose to introduce mediation, and in relation to the protection of victims in particular.
Keywords: mediation, Hungary, restorative justice, SWOT analysis
1  SWOT is the acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats.
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Mediation in criminal cases in Hungary
Under the regulations applicable to mediation in penal matters effective 
from  1  January  2007,  mediation  is  available  for  both  adult  and  juvenile 
offenders if the crime is a crime against the person, a traffic offence or a crime 
against property not punishable by more than five years of imprisonment, and
the parties voluntarily request mediation, •	
the crime has a victim, •	
the offender has pleaded guilty, •	
if the offender is not a habitual offender committing a similar crime for the  •	
second time or committing a crime more than twice,
there was not a criminal procedure pending against the offender at the  •	
time the crime was committed, and
the crime has not resulted in death. •	
In addition to the conditions listed above both the prosecutor and the 
judge have discretion to decide which cases may be referred to mediation. In 
exercising their discretion they need to consider the following factors: whether 
the offender confessed during the course of investigation;  •	
the offender has agreed and is able to compensate the victim for damages  •	
resulting from the crime or to provide any other form of restitution;
the offender and the victim agreed to participate in the mediation pro- •	
ceedings, and
in view of the nature of the crime, the way it was committed and the  •	
offender’s personal circumstances, court proceedings are not required, or 
there is substantial reason to believe that the court will take into account 
the offender’s contrition as a mitigating circumstances (Criminal Procedure 
Act, art. 221/A (3)).
Mediation in penal matters is carried out by the Office of Justice, a 
government agency of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement (now 
called Ministry of Justice and Public Administration). At this time, only specially 
trained probation officers from the Office of Justice and, since 1 January 2008, 
attorneys under contract with the appointed probation service entity for 
mediation activities are authorised to act as mediators. 
Legislation first made mediation available for minor crimes and crimes of 
medium severity (for its detailed procedure see Figure 1). It is only available 
in the phases of the procedure before the prosecutor or the court. The Temida
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mediation procedure may be initiated by the competent prosecutor at its own 
discretion ex officio, or if the parties (or their attorneys) request mediation. In 
contrast, during the court phase, the court is not allowed to order mediation 
ex officio, only at the request of the parties. Both the judge and the prosecutor 
are required by law to inform the parties about the availability of mediation. 
The victim and the offender are to be treated equally in the proceedings and 
they may withdraw their voluntary consent to participate at any time. These 
rules guarantee that mediation cannot proceed if either party objects.
If mediation is successful and the crime is not punishable by more than 3 
years of imprisonment for adult offenders (5 years for juveniles), the criminal case 
is automatically closed and therefore the offender will not have a criminal record. 
When mediation is successful, prosecutors have no discretionary rights to decide 
whether, in their opinion, the result of the mediation is sufficiently “constructive” 
or not; if the mediation qualifies by law as being “constructive”, the criminal case 
must be closed. In these cases, mediation is a diversionary measure, an alternative 
to the regular court procedure, and eliminates the need for a criminal sanction. 
If  the  adult  offender’s  crime  is  punishable  by  more  than  3  years  of 
imprisonment but the statutory sentence does not exceed 5 years, there is an 
indictment and the mediation’s result essentially supplements the outcome 
of the regular court procedure. In this case the judges decide, at their own 
discretion, the extent to which they will take the mediation agreement the 
parties have reached into consideration as a mitigating factor. Borbála Fellegi
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Figure 1: The mediation procedure (Fellegi, Törzs, Velez, forthcoming)
 
Ful￿lment of the agreement   
This date (or the ful￿lment of the ￿rst instalment) 
means the legal end of the VOM, although the 
mediator has further tasks to do.  
In ￿fteen days after the closure of the VOM, the mediator sends a report 
to the prosecutor or judge on the procedure, and also sends the 
document of accord to him  
After receipt of the above mentioned order, the mediator contacts the o￿ender and the victim. 
Within 8 days  it is obligatory to arrange a date for the ￿rst meeting, and send a citation for the 
parties.  
 
A face to face mediation between the o￿ender and the victim takes place. 
When they have reached an accord on the form and details of the restitution (at 
the end of the meeting, or after several meetings), the mediator edits the 
document of agreement which will be signed by him and by the parties
The law permits any forms of restitution that are not against the law or public 
morals. The restitution can be an apology, compensation, reparation of the 
harms caused, or an undertaking to participate in any treatment or other 
programme.   
After hearing the o￿ender and victim, the public 
prosecutor or the judge can order the suspension of the 
criminal proceedings and refer the case to mediation
(length of suspension of the criminal procedure is up to 
6 months)   .
After the VOM proceeding, the mediator looks after the ful￿lment of 
the obligations described in the accord.   
If the o￿ender does not perform his/her obligations or the victim’s 
behaviour hinders the ful￿lment, the mediator reports this to the 
prosecutor or judge.  
 
.Temida
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In the three-year period since the introduction of mediation in penal 
matters, the Probation Service has had approximately 8500 cases referred to 
mediation. The latest trends suggest that more than 80% of mediation cases 
are referred to mediation by the prosecutors, while mediation is based on a 
court decision in less than 20% of the total number of mediation cases. The 
parties have been able to reach an agreement in 80% of mediation cases 
and 90% of the agreements have been kept. The majority (more than half) 
of the cases are crimes against property; the second most frequent type is 
the category of traffic offences and the least common are crimes against the 
person (Office of Justice, 2008, 2009, 2010).
Professional and policy dilemmas regarding  
the general introduction of mediation in Hungary
Over-formalisation and ‘lawyerisation’
The Hungarian system over-emphasises the expert nature of restorative 
justice,  and  this  results  in  a  diminishing  role  of  the  community  through 
volunteers and NGO workers. The clearest sign of this is the over-formalisation 
of  restorative  approaches  and  practices.  The  so-called  ‘lawyerisation’ 
expression refers to a unique solution in Europe, namely that besides probation 
officers, only lawyers, i.e. attorneys, are allowed to conduct mediation in penal 
matters. It is feared that, in this event, “mediator professionals” will “steal” the 
citizens’ power to settle their conflicts, and mediation will become similar to 
formal procedures in spite of the fact that our original goal was to cure the 
problems of formal procedures through mediation. 
Institutionalised solutions v. NGOs; bottom-up v. top-down regulation;  
uneven v. organic regulation 
When social policy is institutionalised, it is a common theoretical and 
practical problem to decide at what social level development should be 
started. Local, typically NGO-initiated micro-level solutions are significant 
because, if local and inter-agency networks are developed, it can be trusted 
that each affected specialised field will cooperate. The applied principles must 
be put into practice in a consistent and strictly controlled manner. This is the Borbála Fellegi
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only way to guarantee quality in service-delivery and that the initial approach 
is not modified during implementation. However, such local programmes 
are only designed to reach relatively small target groups; their results are less 
spectacular and they are more difficult to maintain at a national level.  
In comparison, macro-level initiatives affect larger target groups, and 
they are capable of making fundamental and noticeable changes. These 
goals are often pronounced as the primary considerations of government 
agencies, as results at this level are easy to communicate to voters. However, 
if  institutionalisation  is  carried  out  at  a  national  level,  in  the  course  of 
developing a multi-level institutional regime, it very often happens that the 
starting points, the initial intentions and principles, become ‘lost in transition’. 
By the time a national network and a stable institutional background is 
created, it might well happen that the basic principles defined at the start 
are  compromised,  redefined  or  misinterpreted.  It  does  happen  that  the 
implemented local programmes therefore become distorted versions of the 
first principles and have little to do with the goals originally set. 
The theory and foreign practice of restorative justice suggests that the 
logical way is that demand for restorative practices appears first in small 
communities; this allows the development of pilot programmes, the discovery 
of local requirements and the development of effective solutions (Fellegi, 
2005: 97). In an ideal situation, the formal introduction of restorative justice 
is a bottom-up procedure and international guidance plays a supplementary 
role in the process. 
In Hungary, the process seems to be reversed. NGOs appear to have 
started off too early, and their initiatives could not gain strength as government 
support was missing. The current system is not based on practical experience 
but rather on theoretical expectations. This is because the legal reforms in 
mediation were made due to the pressure exerted by the European Union2 
and the reforms were introduced relatively rapidly and somewhat hastily. In 
this process, the NGOs had little left to do but to carry out the “fine-tuning”. 
The NGOs’ role was limited to importing innovative practices to Hungary, but 
they were not able to grow into a nationwide network. 
However,  civil  society  has  a  crucial  role  in  spreading  and  applying 
methods of alternative dispute resolution in areas other than the justice 
2  Council Framework Decision of 15. March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings Temida
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system (schools, family affairs, employment relations, business life, etc.). This 
is essential to help the approach and practices of amicable dispute resolution 
to become an actual part of everyday life. 
This means that, in the Hungarian legislation, there is unnecessary over-
regulation, which is a sign that the legislator does not trust those applying 
the laws (Fellegi, 2009: 215-307), and, at the same time, regulatory loopholes 
in certain fields. This situation not only makes coordination between services 
impossible but in a number of cases even their introduction is proving to be 
too difficult. 
The lack of coordination is apparent in the field of special policies. This 
is caused by simultaneous government strategies with similar aims and 
overlapping state-funded national professional networks, which fritter away 
the limited funding and human resources available. 
SWOT analysis of the Hungarian system of restorative justice
Strengths 
The main strength of the Hungarian institutionalisation process is that by 
now the state, international and NGO initiatives have more or less caught up 
with each other. The Framework Decision of 2001 has been complied with and 
therefore the majority of the international community’s mediation-related 
expectations have been met. 
Another  strength  is  that  the  probation  service,  which  carries  out  the 
mediation service, now has nationwide coverage; its institutional background 
is reliable and it is an integral part of state administration and the criminal 
justice system. The skills and knowledge of the professionals in the field is 
also a strength. There are a few methodology standards (such as compulsory 
attendance of further training and mandatory involvement in the mentoring 
system and case discussions for staff, continuous documentation and evaluation 
of practice, the provision of information to peer professions and other mediators 
of results and difficulties, requesting feedback from external actors, etc.). Such 
standards are common expectations of any social services and professions. Borbála Fellegi
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Additional strengths of the current system: 
it allows mediation to be used for both adult and juvenile offenders; •	  
in addition to its use as a diversionary measure and for petty crimes, it is  •	
also available in the court phase and for crimes of medium severity; 
a strong emphasis is put on the basic principles specified by the Council of  •	
Europe3 (confidentiality, voluntary basis and the impartiality of the media-
tor in particular); 
it is a requirement that the parties must attend the mediation meeting  •	
directly and in person; and 
persons carrying out mediation activities must meet strict training/qualifi- •	
cation requirements. 
It  is  both  a  pre-requisite  for  and  evidence  of  success  of  successful 
introduction that the number of mediation cases is high. The high number of 
mediation cases will stimulate the process of institutionalisation by generating 
trust  in  mediation  by  the  actors  of  the  justice  system,  the  specialised 
policymakers and the people in general alike. 
Weaknesses 
The weaknesses of the current Hungarian system are the results of a 
process in which the initial principles and intentions become lost or change 
in the course of institutionalisation. The legislator introduced the regulation 
of mediation procedures with relatively short deadlines, without preparation, 
practical experience and pilot programmes, and in a hurried manner. The 
legislator did not even have sufficient information on the basic principles 
of the restorative approach, and could not provide adequate information 
for justice system professionals or prepare them for the changes. All this 
produced an unnecessarily over-regulated statutory background; it seems 
that the legislator did not trust the competence of judges, prosecutors or 
future mediators. Moreover, in spite of this, there are significant differences 
between the levels of application in different locations. (Partners Hungary 
Alapítvány, 2008: 64-68.)
3  Council  of  Europe,  Recommendation  R(99)19  concerning  mediation  in  penal  matters 
(including its Explanatory Memorandum).Temida
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This  means  that  the  current  regulation  of  the  mediation  procedure 
made mediation overly formalised. As a result, victim protection and active 
participation considerations as key elements of the restorative approach, 
while not lost completely, have become secondary factors. Following some 
general remarks, let us list some of the most important weaknesses identified 
concerning the implementation of VOM. 
a) Limiting the number of participants
According  to  Section  7  (3)  of  the  Mediation  Act  in  penal  matters,  a 
maximum of two persons each for the offender and the victim may be present 
at the mediation meeting. It is difficult to understand why it is necessary 
to regulate this in a primary source of law. The fundamental principles of 
restorative approach would suggest that the mediator’s decision should be 
based on the parties’ request concerning whose presence and support they 
want at the meeting (see eg. O’Connell et al., 1999). This limitation also means 
that the state wants to limit the extent of external resources in the procedure. 
This statutory provision excludes the possibility of using the conference model 
in mediation in penal matters, which model would require the participation of 
a larger group of people (O’Connell et al., 1999). 
b)   Lack of trust in those applying the law: excluding the possibility of mediation  
in certain cases 
There are additional details of the legislation that suggest mistrust on 
behalf of the legislator: for instance, the general exclusion of violent crimes 
punishable by more than 5 years of imprisonment or of crimes without a victim. 
Victim protection considerations are taken into account here. However, 
there is a question: why should we rid someone of the chance of meeting 
the offender in person, asking him/her questions and possibly receiving 
restitution just because the crime the victim has experienced is more serious? 
Restorative programmes have significantly higher benefits for victims and 
offenders of serious and violent crimes than for victims and offenders of less 
serious ones (see e.g. Miers et al., 2001; Sherman, Strang, 2007).
Another restriction of the law is that mediation is only allowed when 
the offender confesses/pleads guilty as early as in the investigation phase of the 
procedure. It can reasonably happen that the suspect does not plead guilty Borbála Fellegi
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for each charge brought against him or her, but otherwise would be willing 
to accept responsibility for some of the charges. It is important to observe 
that the police are not allowed to pressure the suspect into a guilty plea.  The 
“plead guilty and they’ll go easy on you” kind of argument is a threat to the 
offender’s basic rights (such as the right to a fair trial). 
In the majority of cases, the actor authorised to order mediation is entitled 
to exclude the possibility of mediation without comprehensive knowledge of the 
parties and the circumstances of the case. A common element of the above is that 
the legislator does not trust the parties applying the law and have an even lower 
opinion of the mediators’ professional skills, that is, whether the mediators can 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether mediation services can be offered if the 
parties voluntarily request it.4 The legislator has therefore taken the option of 
mediation away from a number of victims and offenders (based on the facts of 
the case only) for whom the procedure would be quite beneficial. 
c)   The authorities applying the law have excessive discretionary powers at the 
beginning of the procedure and have no discretionary powers at the end 
Due to the above, a procedural law weakness of the current rules is that 
the referring authority has too much discretionary power before the referral 
is made. Consequently, the legislator places an exceedingly large burden 
of decision-making on the prosecutors/courts when they are obliged to 
decide whether they refer the cases to mediation. From a methodological 
standpoint, it would be a more substantiated solution if it was not primarily 
the prosecutor’s or the judge’s decision as to whether mediation is applicable. 
Prosecutors and judges only know the facts of the case and barely know the 
parties in person. It would be wiser to allow the mediator to make a decision 
on the applicability of mediation and the parties should be informed by the 
mediator of the possibility of mediation as early in the procedure as possible. 
In relation to the role of the authorities applying the law, there is a 
certain doubt whether it is reasonable to close the case automatically, simply 
because the mediation has been successful. The prosecutor’s or the judge’s 
4  Please note that mediation is not simply an alternative to punishment; it can also be used as 
a supplementary procedure. Consequently, if a crime is so severe that the state is not willing 
to give up its right to impose a penalty (for instance, in crimes of robbery), mediation can still 
be used effectively. In this instance, the judge can take into consideration (at his or her own 
discretion) the outcome of the mediation procedure when passing sentence. Temida
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discretionary powers are needed not before but rather after mediation. The 
offenders should be involved in the mediation procedure not only because 
they can avoid punishment (that might also have a re-victimising impact on 
the victim). However, according to the current regulations, in a significant 
proportion of the cases it is guaranteed to the offender that the case will 
be closed. It carries, or rather would carry, an important message if the 
authority applying the law would itself evaluate whether mediation has been 
successful. By accepting the mediation or commenting on it, it would be able 
to communicate to the parties and society that the authority appreciates that 
the parties have reached a mutually acceptable agreement. 
d) The exaggerated role of financial reparation
Another weakness of the current system is that both the legislator and the 
authorities underestimate the importance of non-material (symbolic) reparation. By 
law, mediation qualifies as successful if the offender pays damages to the victim 
or otherwise eliminates/provides remedy for the harmful consequences of the 
crime (Section 36 (1) of the Criminal Code). In practice, the second option is 
appreciated and stressed in a much smaller number of cases by the authorities 
in spite of the fact that it is obvious in a number of mediation cases that 
symbolic gestures have the same importance as financial reparations, or may 
even be more important than the latter. Moreover, victims seem to demand 
symbolic reparation more than was originally expected and they have a creative 
approach to such symbolic undertakings. The Prosecutors’ Memorandum (an 
internal document detailing guidelines) states at points that the prosecutor is 
not allowed to refer cases to mediation when there is no financial loss, or when 
the offender has already paid damages, or when it seems that the offender is 
not in a position to pay damages due to financial constraints. This is the reason 
that mediation is rarely ordered in cases involving juveniles, who generally 
have no income of their own (less than 12% of the total number of mediation 
cases fall into this category) (Office of Justice, 2008, 2009). Additionally, when 
the offender has compensated the victim before the prosecutor’s decision, the 
offender is treated more harshly than if not paying until the decision because 
the offender paying early loses the possibility of mediation, and it is not unlikely 
that the prosecutor will be required to file an indictment. Borbála Fellegi
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e)   The priority of official procedures over victim protection:  
issues of concurrent crimes
Mediation may not be applied to offenders who only plead guilty to some 
of the crimes they are charged with; it may not be applied either when there is 
a procedure against the offender for a crime that is not eligible for mediation, 
and it may not be applied when the offender does not agree to participate in 
the mediation procedure regarding his or her additional charges. Mediation 
is also excluded when there are multiple victims but one or more of them 
refuses to take part in the mediation procedure. The grounds for exclusion 
listed above have been introduced partly because such cases require complex 
administrative efforts to handle the procedures and the crimes separately and 
the prosecutors have no resources to handle such cases. In this regard, the 
current regulations are discriminatory against certain victims regarding their 
eligibility for mediation. 
No mediation is allowed in the event of private prosecution either. The 
question is similar: if there are private prosecution cases (typically petty cases 
that are results of serious emotional conflicts and constitute a heavy workload 
for courts) where the parties would voluntarily request mediation, why are 
they denied the opportunity to attempt to settle the case in this way?
f) The low prestige of the mediator profession 
In  addition  to  retrained  probation  officers,  only  attorneys  may  be 
registered  as  criminal  mediators.  This  is  discrimination  against  those 
professions that are properly qualified mediators, it also makes it difficult to 
implement the principle of representativeness recommended by the Council 
of Europe and also it sends the wrong message that one must have a bar 
exam, otherwise he/she cannot act as a mediator. A degree in law seems to 
be an irrelevant prerequisite, while probably even lawyers need more than 
the average level of training, supervision and self-awareness. Temida
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Opportunities 
However, the current institutional, regulatory and practical experience 
may allow:
evaluative research (supported by social science methods) and qualitative  •	
and quantitative impact studies to be carried out on the applicability and 
special characteristics of the restorative approach in Hungary;
the justice, social, education and other ministries intending to apply alter- •	
native dispute resolution comprehensively to continue such activities and 
adopt strategies for the purpose of making further improvements;
us to witness the spread of the new approach within the affected professi- •	
ons and the population;
professionals and specialised policymakers to realise that, due to the incre- •	
asing levels and worsening forms of juvenile delinquency and behavioural 
problems, there is no other solution to these problems but the introduction 
of alternative dispute resolution in as many areas of society as possible;
the interdisciplinary approach to become a more serious expectation in  •	
the development of criminal and social policy institutions when future 
development is planned;
the international network of connections broaden and strengthen, the  •	
possibilities of exchange of practical information improve and the chances 
of obtaining available European Union funding increase. 
Threats
The  main  threats  to  the  system  include  (but  are  not  limited  to  the 
following): 
It is feared that, if the characteristics of the system listed as weaknesses and  •	
criticised above do not change (either because the specialised policymakers 
do not agree with the criticism or, even if they agree, they lack the political 
will and the institutional flexibility required for implementing the reforms) 
it may result in difficulties if future regulatory and institutional changes are 
introduced without preparation, pilot and experimental projects and the rela-
ted exchange of information, inter-professional consultation and comprehen-
sive groundwork, in the same way as these were missed in the past. 
It is feared that  •	 there will be inappropriate and insufficient feedback/exter-
nal evaluation to analyse the effects and results of practical implementation, Borbála Fellegi
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in spite of the fact that these are necessary for the well-designed further 
development of the system. 
If the legislator and authorities/persons applying the law involved in the  •	
processes do not expand their knowledge of the basic principles and broa-
der connections of the restorative approach, it may happen that a practice 
that has begun to be implemented will be slowly eaten up by the justice system 
and local professionals will tend to become defensive because they will 
believe that the reform is just another unnecessary and time-consuming 
thing that takes a lot of learning but is hardly effective and has only been 
introduced because their work so far has not produced results. The lack of 
positive feedback and support, the growing professional uncertainty, lack 
of competence and the feeling that they have been left alone will increase 
the level of resistance to (and suspicion of) colleagues initiating the deve-
lopment of good practices in the given organisation.
The  •	 internal problems of organisations with an interest in the application of 
restorative practices must be taken into account. The reparative approach’s 
success largely depends on the ability of the affected professionals to discover 
the conflicts, to communicate candidly, to consult with partners, to be open to 
the other’s views and to develop and implement innovative practices. 
Uncertainties about funding, financial insecurity and cutting resources  •	
are all dangerous as the lack of confidence in making a living carries a risk 
both at a personal and at an organisational level. 
The impact of the media, which is interested in revealing sensational news  •	
and creating conflicts. The media can easily trigger a popular demand for 
unnecessarily harsh retribution and exclusion. 
Closing words
It is apparent on the basis of the analysis above that the “muscle gain” 
in mediation has started in Hungary as a stable institutional and regulatory 
background is available and the number of mediation cases is now measured 
in thousands. It is definitely a breakthrough, as Hungary is still a relatively new 
democracy where both the NGO sector and conflict resolution techniques 
based on democratic values are novelties and the progress of mediation has a 
positive effect on both. Temida
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However, the time has come for “muscle toning” due to the weaknesses of 
the system and the fact that basic principles now seem to be lost from sight. 
”Muscle  toning”  can  be  achieved  through  keeping  existing  strengths  and 
opportunities, identifying weaknesses and threats and developing the necessary 
reforms. These need to be analysed regularly to set the direction of the reforms 
and this can mean sufficient support for other countries that, similarly to 
Hungary, are working on the institutionalisation of restorative justice.   
Finally, this is all about one thing: that the practice of restorative justice 
should reflect the underlying principles, namely, that citizens and the victims of 
crimes in particular, must be given the opportunity to voice their needs as well 
as to handle their conflicts peacefully and in a constructive manner, even if they 
are subjects of the worst type of conflicts such as the most serious crimes. 
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Izgradnja i toniranje: analiza institucionalizacije medijacije  
u krivičnom postupku u Mađarskoj
U Mađarskoj je od 1. januara 2007. godine, žrtvama i učiniocima krivičnih dela 
ponuđena prilika da učestvuju u medijaciji. U ovom radu će najpre biti dat kratak pregled 
trenutne situacije vezane za medijaciju u krivičnim stvarima u Mađarskoj, a zatim će 
biti razmotrene neke opšte pojave i dileme koje se tiču uvođenja medijacije uopšte. 
Posle toga će biti prikazana tzv. SWOT analiza trenutnog sistema medijacije u krivičnim 
starima u Mađarskoj. Osnovni cilj ovog rada je da se uspostave određeni kriterijumi za 
dalji razvoj restorativnog pristupa. Lekcije koje smo naučili, snage i mogućnosti sistema, 
kao i identifikacija nedostataka mogu se pokazati korisnim za druge zemlje koje odluče 
da uvedu medijaciju, a posebno u odnosu na zaštitu prava žrtava. 
Ključne reči: medijacija, Mađarska, restorativna pravda, SWOT analiza.